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 This dissertation is part of the effort to contribute to our understanding of Price 
Competition and Firm Strategies in oligopolistic markets with certain characteristics. It 
comprises of three chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and background of the 
research  and a brief summary of results. 
 
Chapter 2: Firms practice poaching of their rival’s customers in markets where 
they are able to identify between their own customers and those of the rivals. This 
practice results in inefficiently high switching. In some of these markets firms also use 
strategies that make poaching by rival firms harder. In this chapter I explore the practice 
of firms requiring customers to sign contracts that are of pre-specified duration specifying 
early termination charges (or breach penalty). If contract with breach penalty is available, 
 
firms find it privately optimal to use it. However when all firms use it they are worse off 
and results in lower than efficient switching. Consumers may be better off or worse off. 
 
Chapter 3: In this chapter we examine the pricing decision of a typical firm that 
sells more than one product in markets where products are strategic complements and the 
firms have some market power.  We show that such a firm internalizes the strategic 
complementarities when optimally choosing its prices leading to higher prices. We then 
empirically test and confirm in the US wholesale market for unbranded gasoline that a 
major refiner charges a higher wholesale price for unbranded gasoline in cities where it 
also sells its brand gasoline at retail compared to cities where it does not. Furthermore, in 
the cities where the refiner has brand presence at retail we find empirical evidence that its 
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 Starting from the seminal paper by Bertrand1, which led to the introduction of the 
Bertrand Paradox, price competition among oligopolistic firms has always been a rich 
area of research for both Industrial Organization Theory and Applied Microeconomics.   
Unlike in perfect competition or a monopoly, firms in an oligopolistic market structure 
face an environment where rival firms anticipate their actions and counter them. Firms 
therefore need to make strategic decisions based on the information available to them. In 
the short run, one of the most important strategic choice variables is the price (others 
include advertising and sales intensity). The optimal choice of price is often the most 
important strategic decision facing businesses and therefore the study of strategic price 
competition not only has a strong academic appeal but also a useful practical side. 
However price competition never occurs in a vacuum. There always exist other 
instruments or conditions which either facilitate or hinder price competition. There is a 
vast economic literature, both theoretical and empirical which studies price competition 
in the presence of these other instruments or conditions dating back to Edgeworth2 (1897) 
and Hotelling3 (1929). Edgeworth looked at price competition with firms facing capacity 
constraints in the sense that they cannot sell more than they are capable of producing. 
                                                 
1 Bertrand, J. 1883. Theory Mathematique de la Richesse Sociale. Journal des Savants, pp 449-508 
2 The Pure Theory of Monopoly, in Papers Relating to Political Economy,  volume 1, ed. F. Edgeworth ( 
London: Macmillan, 1925) 




Hotelling introduced product differentiation in the form of transportation cost. 
Introducing these extra conditions led to the resolution of the Bertrand Paradox!  
 This dissertation is part of the effort to contribute to our understanding of price 
competition and firm strategies in oligopolistic markets with certain unique 
characteristics. It comprises of three chapters. Chapter 1 provides the introduction and 
background of the research work.  In chapter 2 we study price competition in markets 
where firms can identify between its own customers and rival firms customers and where 
switching costs are present. In such markets, firms often compete for new and rival firm’s 
customers by offering discounts to entice them to switch suppliers, a practice known as 
consumer poaching. This chapter looks at the common practice in the cellular phone 
service industry in the US of requiring customers to sign contracts with early termination 
fees as a means to counter consumer poaching.  
Chapter 3 looks at price competition in markets where strategic complementarities 
are present and look at optimal pricing decisions of firms that sell two products that are 
strategic complements. In a simple model we show that such a firm internalizes these 
complementarities while optimally choosing prices and as a result charges a higher price 
compared to a firm that sell only one product. We then find empirical  evidence for the 
above in the wholesale market for gasoline in the United States. In such local wholesale 
markets for unbranded gasoline, we find that refiners that sell both branded and 
unbranded gasoline charge a higher price for unbranded gasoline compared to refiners 
that sell only unbranded gasoline. 




Chapter 2 looks at markets that have a unique feature commonly observed in 
subscription markets for services for example, the credit card market, cable and long-
distance telephone service, insurance market, etc.  In such market, firms that provide the 
services can usually identify between their own customers and rival firm’s customers. 
Firms in these markets practice poaching, i.e., enticing the rival firm’s customers to 
switch suppliers by offering discounts.  We examine price competition in such markets in 
which consumers incur costs to switch between firms and are thus partially locked in. 
Firms on the other hand can price discriminate between its locked customers and new 
customers (or rival firm’s customers).   
 Price Competition in the presence of switching costs has received wide attention 
in the literature4. Von Weiszacker5(1984) first looked at a model  with switching costs 
and showed that higher switching costs may make markets more competitive. The reason 
is that higher switching cost combined with uncertain consumer future tastes makes 
consumers more farsighted. Current choices are influenced more by the future, making 
current preferences less important and therefore making the products less differentiated.  
Klemperer6 (1987) observes rightly that the above conclusion depends on the assumption 
that firms would charge the same prices in subsequent periods. In a model which  allowed 
firms to charge a different price in later periods, Klemperer showed that the presence of 
switching costs make demand more inelastic in both the initial and subsequent periods 
and may make market less competitive in both periods. Chen7(1997) extends 
                                                 
4 See, for example, Klemperer (1987a, b), Farrell and Shapiro (1988), Beggs and Klemperer (1992), Padilla 
(1992, 1995). Klemperer (1995) provides an excellent survey of the literature 
5 Von Weizsacker, C. C. “ The Costs of Substitiution” Econometrics, Vol. 52(1984), pp 1085-1116 
6 Klemperer P. “The Competitiveness of markets with switching costs” Rand Journal of Economics. Vol. 
18 (1987a) pp 137-150 
7 Chen, Y. “ Paying Customers to Switch”,  Journal of Economics and Management Strategies, vol. 




Klemperer’s case to allow  firms to price discriminate between existing customers and 
new customers and showed in a two-period homogeneous good duopoly model that firms 
are worse off engaging in this practice of  price-discrimination (or poaching) and results 
in excessive switching in equilibrium. In his model however, switching is always 
inefficient because net of the switching costs consumers are identical and goods are 
homogeneous. Taylor8 (2003) looked at  the case where there are more than two firms 
and showed  that the market becomes fully competitive only when there are more than 
two firms. Each firm earns economic rent on its customer base but zero economics profit. 
The fully competitive equilibrium leads to higher (inefficient) switching. 
The above papers miss one important feature that is common in the US cell phone 
service industry. Service providers commonly require new customers to sign fixed length 
contracts specifying early termination charges (breach penalty) if they switch providers 
before the end of the contract. This provides an instrument to the firms to counter 
consumer poaching by rivals.  Introduction of this new feature changes the structure of 
the price competition in two important ways, (1) switching costs become endogenous 
through contractual provisions and (2) firms are able to commit to second period prices 
through the contract. 
I examine a two-period duopoly model where firms are homogeneous in the first 
period but in the second period, firm specific tastes (in the manner of Hotelling) and 
switching costs emerge and where one or both firms offer a two period pricing contract 
along with a breach penalty.  Note that despite ex ante homogeneity, firms earn positive 
profits because there is ex post differentiation in the second period. I show that, when 
                                                 
8 Taylor, C “ Supplier Surfing: Competition and Consumer Behavior in Subscription Markets”  RAND 




contracts are feasible, not using contracts does not survive iterative elimination of 
dominated strategies. Offering a contract with breach penalty (CWP) is  an optimal 
response. If the rival firm is not locking in customers, the other firm wants to. However 
in equilibrium when all firms use CWP first period competition yields lower firm profits 
than would occur if contracts were not feasible.  Also compared to the previous literature, 
in the equilibrium with CWP there is less switching than is socially efficient. Contracts 
prevent some efficient switching. The result is quite interesting because it has been often 
commented upon that this practice disadvantage customers by locking them in and 
conversely, firms profit by using this practice. In fact, we find that the opposite is true. 
1.2 Motivation and Introduction to Chapter 3: 
 Chapter 3 looks at Price Competition in markets with strategic complements. The 
industry I study is the wholesale markets of gasoline in the United States where branded 
and unbranded gasoline are considered strategic complements.  In a seminal paper, 
Bulow, Geanakoplos and Klemperer9 (1985) introduced the concept of strategic 
complements and substitutes.  In oligopolistic markets the distinction between strategic 
complements and substitutes is determined by whether a more “aggressive” strategy by 
one firm raises or lowers the other’s marginal profit from an increase in its own strategy. 
In short, two products are defined as strategic complements in price if an increase in price 
of one product increases the marginal profitability of raising the price of the other 
product. The converse is true for strategic substitutes. We examine the pricing decision of 
a firm that sells more than one product in markets where products are strategic 
complements and the firms have some market power. In a simple theoretical model I 
                                                 
9 Bulow, J., Geanakoplos, J., Klemperer, P. “ Multimarket Oligopolies: Strategic  Substitutes and 




show that a firm that sells two products that are strategic complements internalizes these 
complementarities when optimally choosing the prices. It results in higher prices 
compared to a firm that sells only one product. 
 In the empirical part of the chapter, I find evidence of the above in the wholesale 
market for unbranded gasoline in the United States. There has been some amount of 
previous empirical literature on the wholesale gasoline industry  in the United States (see 
Kapoor (2003), Hastings10 (2004), etc). Borenstein and Shepard11 (2002) find that 
wholesale prices of gasoline respond with a lag to crude oil cost shocks due to the 
presence of adjustment cost in production and inventory. They also find that refiners have 
market power in the wholesale markets and that those with more market power adjust 
more slowly. Pinske, Slade and Brett12(2003) finds that competition is highly localized in 
the wholesale market for unbranded gasoline. The empirical part of chapter 3 is closest to 
Gilbert and Hastings13 (2005) who examined the relationship between vertical integration 
and wholesale prices of gasoline. They looked at the 1997 acquisition by Tosco of 
Unocal’s west coast refining and retailing assets and find evidence consistent with the 
strategic incentive to raise rivals’ cost. They concluded that, in the presence of upstream 
market power, changes in vertical market structure can have substantial impact on 
upstream firm conduct and on equilibrium prices. 
 In the United States wholesale market for gasoline, the sellers are the refiners who 
may be either Majors, like BP, Shell, Chevron, etc. or Independent refiners who do not 
                                                 
10  Hastings, J. “ Vertical Relationships and Competition in Retail Gasoline Markets: Empirical Evidence 
from Contract Changes in Southern California” American Economic Review, March 2004 
11 Borenstein, S. and Shepard, A. “ Sticky Prices, Inventories, Market Power in Wholesale Gasoline 
Market”  Rand Journal of Economics  vol. 33  no. 1 Spring 2002 pp 116-139 
12 Pinske, J., Slade, M.E., Brett, C. “Spatial Price Competition: A Semi Parametric Approach” 
Econometrica Vol. 70 , No. 3 (May 2002) pp 1111-1153. 
13 Gilbert, R. and Hastings, J.” Market Power, Vertical Integration and the Wholesale Price of Gasoline”, 




have a brand name at retail. Majors sell both branded and unbranded gasoline at many 
wholesale markets whereas Independent refiners sell only unbranded gasoline. So majors 
that sell both types of gasoline at a market have a strategic incentive to internalize the 
complementarities when optimally choosing price. In our empirical section we looked at 
the price of unbranded gasoline charged by refiners that sell both branded and unbranded 
gasoline at the wholesale markets compared to price charged by refiners selling only 
unbranded gasoline. We perform two types of empirical exercises depending on the scope 
of the data available. The first exercise is for the whole set of refiners (firms) selling 
wholesale unbranded gasoline in the United States and for all city terminals located in the 
United States in the time period of our analysis. For this dataset we only have information 
on whether a refiner sells only unbranded gasoline (one product) or both unbranded and 
branded gasoline (two products) but no additional information on the market shares of the 
refiners. The main result of this exercise is that refiners that sell both unbranded and 
branded gasoline at a city terminal charge a higher price for unbranded gasoline 
compared to refiners that sell only unbranded gasoline. 
The second empirical exercise is done for a major refiner, Marathon Petroleum, 
which operates in 99 city terminals (wholesale markets). The wholesale dataset is 
augmented with the share14 of Marathon brand retail stations. This share is a proxy for 
the market share of Marathon’s branded gasoline. Marathon has retail brand presence in a 
little more than half of the 99 markets (city terminals) where it sells wholesale unbranded 
gasoline. The main results of this empirical exercise are the following. First, we find that 
Marathon charges a significantly higher price for unbranded gasoline in those markets 
                                                 
14   By share here, we mean the share retail stations selling Marathon Brand gasoline to the total number of 
retail stations in the market. This is a proxy measure for the market share of Marathon Brand Gasoline at 




where it also sells branded gasoline (i.e., has retail brand presence).  This results in 
similar to the result obtained from first exercise. Second, the share of Marathon brand 
retail stations has a positive and significant impact on the price Marathon charges for 
unbranded gasoline. This suggests that the gain from internalizing the strategic 
complementarities is increasing in the market share of the second product. Third, in a 
non-linear specification of the reduced form estimation, we find that the price of 
unbranded gasoline charged by marathon is concave in the share of its branded retail 
stations. Finally, we find that the number of refiners selling unbranded gasoline in the 
wholesale market has a negative and significant impact on the price of unbranded 
gasoline charged by Marathon. This result confirms the accepted view  that competition 


























Countering Consumer Poaching: The case of 
Contracts with Breach Penalty. 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In many business settings firms are able to identify between their own customers 
and new (rival firm’s) customers. In such settings firms often practice pricing policies 
where they offer discounts to new (rival firm’s) customers in markets with switching 
costs. An example of a market where such a pricing policy is commonly observed is the 
market for long distance telephone services in the United States where rival firms 
routinely offer discounts (monetary or in the form of free long distance minutes of 
comparable monetary value) to rival firm’s customers to switch. Others examples are the 
market for credit cards and the market for high-speed internet service. This type of 
competition where firms offer consumers enticement to switch suppliers is common in 
subscription markets for homogeneous goods [Taylor 2003]. In a two period 
homogeneous good duopoly model, Chen [97] showed that in equilibrium firms are 
worse off engaging in this practice of poaching on rival firm’s customers than if they 
can’t discriminate between customers. Furthermore consumers need not necessarily 




efficient in a homogeneous goods model with switching cost the dead weight loss to 
society of switching is higher. Taylor [2003] extended Chen’s results for the case where 
there are more than two firms in the market and showed that the market becomes fully 
competitive only when there are more than two firms. Each firm earns economic rent on 
its customer base but zero economics profit. An interesting result that he showed was that 
the fully competitive equilibrium leads to higher (inefficient) switching. 
 
It is interesting to note that the above papers have focused on only one part of the 
business practice by the firms, viz. trying to poach on rival firms customers. However 
firms also develop strategies that make it harder for rival firms to entice their present 
customers to switch or in the event they actually switch, the firm can extract some rent 
from their rivals. For example it is common practice in the US Cellular phone industry 
for customers to sign contracts (one year or two years) with the service provider. Such a 
contract specifies price for the length of the contract and an early termination fee (breach 
penalty) if the customer switches to a different provider before the contract expires. This 
is an instrument, which increases the switching cost of the consumers. In the light of the 
results of the above papers my research questions are the following. 
Could the practice of contracts with breach penalties be used by firms as an 
instrument to mitigate excessive poaching by rival firms? 
How does the equilibrium with contracts and penalties compare to the one when firms 
can’t use this practice? In particular how do firms profits compare when they can use 




I look at a model where firms are homogeneous in the first period but in the 
second period switching costs and possibly, firm specific tastes emerge. I examine two 
cases. The “Base Case” is like Klemperer (1987 a) and Chen (1999), where firms 
compete in each period. Firms can identify incumbent customers and charge them 
different prices. In the “Contract with Breach Penalty” (CWP) case, one or both firms 
offer a two period pricing contract along with a breach penalty in the first period .  
Note that despite ex ante homogeneity, firms earn positive profits because there is ex post 
differentiation in period 2.  In the base case, firms price below marginal cost in the first 
period, and compete vigorously in the second period for rival customers. Compared to the 
efficient outcome, there is excessive switching.  In CWP, I show that offering a contract 
with breach penalty is privately optimal. If the rival firm is not locking in customers, the 
other firm wants to. In CWP, there is less switching than is socially efficient. Contracts 
prevent some efficient switches.  Also I find that in CWP, first period competition yields 
lower firm profits than would occur if contracts were not feasible. 
 
2.2 The Homogeneous product model 
2.2.1 The Base Model 
Consider the two period homogeneous good duopoly model. There are two firms 
A and B selling a homogeneous good. Both firms produce the good at a constant 
marginal cost c. There is a continuum of consumers with mass normalized to one. There 
are two periods and each consumer demands a unit of the good in each of the two 
periods. Consumers have high enough reservation value for the good that all consumers 




firms, she incurs a switching cost (exogenous), s, which she learns privately at the 
beginning of the second period. We assume that s is distributed uniformly over the 
interval [0,1]. Firms have a discount factor Fδ  and consumer have a discount factor, Cδ . 
We assume that 10 ≤≤≤ FC δδ . In the second period firm can tell whether a consumer is 
its first period consumer or that of the rival. So the firm can poach (price discriminate) on 
the consumers of the rival firm in the second period. As a benchmark case, let us consider 
the case where long term contract with breach penalty is not available as an instrument to 
the firms. 
 
2.2.1a Second Period Competition 
In the second period each firm has an established market share from the first 
period, α  for A and α−1  for firm B. Firm i chooses two prices in the second period: a 
price iip  that it charges to its previous period customers and another price, ijp  to the firm 
j’s previous period customers who switch to i in the second period (i, j = A or B). Now 
consider the marginal consumer of firm A who is indifferent between switching to B or 
staying with A. Her realization of switching costs, s is such that the following is true. 
  
        spp BAAA +=  
BAAA pps −=⇒  
 






 ]1[)](1[ BAAAAA ppsFq −−=−= αα  
and, 
 
 ][)( BAAABA ppsFq −== αα  
Similarly, consider the marginal first period consumer of firm B who is indifferent 
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The first term is the profit from first period customers who choose to stay with A in the 
second period and the second term is profit from the rival firm’s first period customers 
who switch to firm A in the second period. 

















Firm A chooses AAp and ABp  to maximize 2Aπ  taking second period prices of firm B as 
given and firm B chooses BBp and BAp  to maximize 2Bπ  taking second period prices of 
firm A as given. The first order conditions yields the following best response functions of 




























The second order sufficient conditions are satisfied. Solving the above equations 
















Note that in the equilibrium firms charge a lower price to rival’s first period customers to 
induce them to switch. There is second period switching in the equilibrium. In fact, one-
third of the total customer population switch firms in the second period. Given that the 
product is homogeneous and switching is costly this is clearly inefficient 
Substituting the second period equilibrium prices in the firms’ second period profit we 

























Note that, the second period profits of each firm is increasing in its first period market 
share. Firms compete for market shares in the first period. 
 
2.2.1b First Period Competition 
Consider consumer’s choice of firms in the first period. Since both firms charge the same 
price in equilibrium in the second period, consumer’s choice of firms in the first period 
depends solely on the first period prices. Since consumers are ex-ante identical, all 
consumers will choose A, )1.,.( =αei  if the first period price of A is less than that of B, 
i.e., 11 BA pp < . Conversely all consumers will choose B, )0.,.( =αei  if 11 BA pp > . If  
11 BA pp = , we assume that consumers choose A and B with equal probability. So 2
1
=α  
if 11 BA pp = . 
Proposition 1. 
 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. The subgame 











and in the second period each firm chooses prices iip  and ijp  optimally as described in 




 The formal proof is given in the appendix. The intuition is simple. Because of the 
presence of switching cost in the second period, firms can charge a higher price to its 
customers in the second period. Firms earn positive profits in the second period which are 
increasing in first period market shares.  So firms compete for market share in the first 
period. This leads to intense price competition in the first period yielding first period 
prices less than marginal cost. The firms earn the same two-period equilibrium 























ππ      
Note that firms earn positive profits. This is because each firm can guarantee itself of at 
least the equilibrium profit by not competing in the first period and poaching on its rival 
firm’s customers in the second period. So equilibrium profits are not driven down to zero. 
This equilibrium profit is however known to be lower15 than that if firms were not able to 
poach on rival firm’s customers in the second period. 
 
The expected surplus of a consumer who bought from firm i in the first period can 
be expressed as: 
]])|[()[()( 1 jijiiiiici
i qswitchsEpvqpvpvEU +−+−+−= δ  
The first term is first period surplus and the second term is discounted second-period 
expected surplus. The first term of which is surplus if the consumer stays with the same 
firm in the second period times the probability that she will stay and the second term is 
expected surplus of switching in the second period times probability of switching. In 
                                                 
15  Chen [97] has shown this to hold true. CHEN, Y. " Paying Customers to Switch " Journal of Economics 





equilibrium the expected consumer surplus of buying from firm A is the same as that 
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2.2.2 Contracts with Breach Penalty (CWP) 
Definition 1: 
 A contract with breach penalty (CWP) is a 3-tuple ),,( 1 iiii pp τ  where iii pandp 1  are 
defined as before and iτ  is a breach penalty to be paid by the first period customer if she 
switches to firm j in the second period. 
Consumer’s first period choice: 
 We assume that consumers are rational and they have a discount factor, cδ .  A 
rational consumer will choose A over B if her expected consumer surplus from choosing 
A in the first period is greater than that from choosing B., i.e., 




i qswitchsEpvqpvpvEU +−+−+−= δ  
 Assume that consumers discount future more than firms do, i.e., 10 ≤≤≤ Fc δδ  
 
Proposition 2:  
If Contact with Breach Penalty (CWP) is available as an instrument then no strategies 
that involve not using CWP survive iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 
 
 In other words if CWP is feasible then any strategy that involve not using CWP is not 




show that if firm B doesn’t use CWP and it chooses prices optimally then firm A can do 
better by using CWP which stops its first period customers from switching to firm B in 
the second period. See appendix for the formal proof. 
Proposition 2 states that in the game where contracts are feasible both firms will 
use contracts. The equilibrium outcome of the game turns out to be unique. Both firms 
use CWP and split the market in the first period. The first period price charged by both 
firms is )(1 cvcp Fi −−= δ  and the second period contract price and poaching price are 
candv   respectively. The outcome however can be supported by multiple equilibrium 
strategies as shown in proposition 3 below. These strategies differ only in one aspect, the 
penalty level. The prices remain the same. Any penalty, cvi −≥τ , completely stops 
switching and hence any penalty level greater than that threshold are economically 
equivalent as it pertains to the outcome of the game. 
 
Proposition 3: 
There exists a unique family  of subgame perfect equilibria of the game (one equilibrium 
for each penalty level) in which both firms use CWP and the equilibrium strategies are as 
below: 































The proof is given in the appendix. 
The second period profit of firm A can be expressed as: 
 ABABBAAAAAAA qcpqcpcp ))(1()()(2 −−+−−−−= ατααπ  
  
The second term is firm A’s “net” loss arising from firm B’s poaching on its customers.  
We say “net” because A loses sales revenue from consumer leaving it but receives rent in 
the form of penalties from the consumers who do leave. This net loss can be non-positive 
only if cpAAA −≥τ . But then 0=ABq . The intuition is simple. Along the relevant range 
of price where B will profitably poach, it is never profitable for A to let B poach, i.e., its 
rent from penalties is always less than its loss from poaching.  A can assure itself of a 
non-positive loss by choosing a penalty, cpAAA −≥τ , which stops switching completely. 
 At the proposed equilibrium, the second period poaching price is, cpij =
* . There is no 
switching in equilibrium and since switching is costly, this is efficient. 
The second period equilibrium profit for firm A reduces to )(* 2 cpAAA −= απ . This is 
increasing in the first period market share, α . The two period discounted profit for firm 
A can be expressed as: 
 )]()[( 1 cvcp FAA −+−= δαπ  
The same argument is true for firm B too. So firms compete for market share in the first 
period in the Bertrand fashion. This drives down the first period price and profit until 
equilibrium discounted profit is zero. So firms are worse off when CWP is feasible than 
when it is not. 





i cvEU δ+−=  
Comparing with the expected discounted consumer surplus from the model with no 





ii ifonlyandifEUEU δδ . So, in this range of firm’s 
and consumer’s discount factor, consumers are better off when firms use CWP. However 
firms are worse off. 
In the above model when products are completely homogeneous, the equilibrium penalty 
is not unique. This is because equilibrium penalty so high that it stops switching 
completely and so in the equilibrium, penalties do not affect switching at the margin. 
 
2.3 Ex-ante Homogeneous Ex-post Product Differentiation Model. 
 We enrich the previous model by allowing for horizontal product differentiation 
in the second period. The motivation is the following. Consumers are inherently 
heterogeneous in their preferences for the product. In the first period when a customer is 
considering purchasing the product from some firm, she does not have enough 
information to differentiate between the various products offered and hence view them as 
homogeneous products. However in the second period when she has experienced one 
product for sometime, the true characteristics are revealed and she knows exactly how 
close the product is to her “ideal” product characteristics. 
 Assumption 1: Second period location of consumer, x is uniformly distributed over [0,1] 
Assumption 2: Firm A located at 0 and Firm B is located at 1. 
Assumption 3: Second period switching cost is distributed over the unit interval, [0,1]. 
 




 Let us now look at the case when CWP is not available as an instrument to the 
firm. 
2.3.1a: Second Period Competition. 
 The marginal first period customer of firm A realizes a 2-tuple (x, s) such that the 
following holds: 
 sxpxp BAAA +−+=+ )1(  
Competition in Firm A’s first period customers’ market segment yields the following 



















12 +−=− AABA ppsx  
Figure 2.1. Competition in A’s first period customers market segment. 
The above shaded region represents the A’s first period customers who switches to firm 




“poaching” in firm A’s first period customers market segment which is given below for 
















































Note that, the first two ranges represent cases where the “poaching” price by firm B is 
greater than the second-period price to own-customer by firm A. Here, firm B is not 
actively poaching, and switching may occur only due to extremely “bad” realization of 
the location random variable, x combined with a realization of a low enough switching 
cost, s. The last two ranges shows cases where the “poaching” price by firm B is too low 
compared to the second-period price to own-customer by firm A. It is shown in the 
appendix that it is never profitable for firm B to poach in these ranges. 
The relevant poaching region is given by the third range, i.e., 10 ≤−≤ BAAA pp . We will 
describe the equilibrium in this poaching range. 
Similarly for marginal first period customer of firm B: 
 sxpxp ABBB ++=−+ )1(  
























12 +−=+ ABBB ppsx  
Figure 2.2. Competition in Firm B’s first period customers market segment. 
 
  Analogously, the shaded region represents firm A’s “poaching” of firm B’s first 
period customers for a given set of prices, ),( ABBB pp  and this is given below for all range 





















































As before, Firms A and B maximize their second period profit by choosing a set of two 
prices, one for its own first period customers and another a poaching price. The problem 
is symmetric for both firms. Let us look at firm A’s maximization problem. Firm A’s 
second period profit is: 
 ABABBAAAA qcpqcp ))(1()1)((2 −−+−−= ααπ  
The first term is profit from A’s first period customers who stay with it in the second 
period and the second term is profit from poaching on B’s first period customers. Let us 
focus on the relevant poaching region where 10 ≤−≤ BAAA pp  and 10 ≤−≤ ABBB pp . 
Plugging in the demands for the above regions, the second period profit for firm A is then 
given by: 
 [ ] [ ]{ })(21))(1()(23)(
4
1
2 BBABABAABAAAA ppcpppcp −−−−+−+−= ααπ  


























































Solving the above best response functions yields the unique Nash equilibrium prices of 





7 **** +==+== cppandcpp BAABBBAA  












2 απαπ −+=+= BA and . 
It is easy to check that the above set of equilibrium prices are indeed in the relevant 
poaching regions discussed earlier and that there is switching in the equilibrium. In 
particular the proportions of first period customers who switch firms in the second period 
for both firms are the same given by: 
 
12
5** == BAAB qq  
So in equilibrium a little less than half of the customers switch firms. Compared to the 
case with no second period product differentiation, equilibrium switching is higher. This 
is not surprising. In the first case, since the products are homogeneous, switching by a 
customer is solely motivated by the difference in the second period offered by its first 
period firm and the second period poaching price of the rival firm. With product 
differentiation there is another incentive for consumers to switch that arises due to the 
realization of their true preferences in the second period. 
 Socially Efficient Amount of Switching. 
 In this model switching is not altogether inefficient as was the case with the first 
model when any switching is socially inefficient. This is because for consumers with 




efficient to switch. However we will show that there is excessive switching in 
equilibrium. 
 Efficient switching arises when switching is solely motivated by the relative 
trade-offs between the switching cost, s and the second period preference parameter, x 
and not due to difference in second period prices. This implies that socially efficient 
switching occurs when ** BAAA pp =  and 
**
ABBB pp = . Plugging these values in the demands 
we get the socially efficient amount of switching, 
4
1** == BAAB qq , i.e., social efficiency 
entails that one-fourth of the market switches firms in the second period. See figure 2.3. 






















Figure 2.3. Socially efficient switching. 
   
 Note that, similar to the first model, the second period profit is increasing in first 
period market share. This will have implications for first period prices as firms compete 





2.3.1b: First Period Competition. 
 We assume that consumers are rational in the following sense. A consumer will 
choose the firm that gives the highest expected consumer surplus for the two period given 
first period prices. Since the second period prices for the two firms are the same in 
equilibrium consumers will choose firms solely on the basis of the first period prices. 
And since all consumers are ex-ante identical all consumers will choose A over B if the 
first period price of A is lower than that of B and vice versa, i.e., 1=α  if 11 BA pp <  and 
0=α  if 11 BA pp > . As before we assume that consumers choose A and B with equal 
probability if  they charge the same first period price, i.e., 
2
1
=α  if 11 BA pp = . 
Proposition 4: 
There exists a unique symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game in which 
contracts(CWP) are not feasible. The strategies are as follows: 





−=  and in the second period it chooses 
ijii pandp  optimally as described in the last section. 
The firms split the market in the first period, i.e.,
2
1
=α . The equilibrium two-period 
discounted profit of the firms is: 
 FBA δππ 72
25** ==  
 The formal proof is similar to that of proposition 1 and is given in the appendix. A 






































Notice that the profits are increasing in the respective first period market shares. So firms 
compete for market shares in the first period by cutting first period prices in the Bertrand 
fashion. Note also, that firm i can assure itself of a positive profit equal to Fδ72
25  by 
choosing not to compete in the first period and then poaching on its rival firm’s market in 
the second period. For any first period price above the proposed equilibrium price, 
Bertrand competition in the first period prices drives down equilibrium profit to this 
reservation value. If firm i chooses a first period price below the equilibrium price, it 
captures the entire market but its profit is less than Fδ72
25 . So the proposed equilibrium 
prices indeed constitute equilibrium. 
 
 Compared to the equilibrium of the model with no ex-post product differentiation 
in the second period, the firms earn a higher equilibrium profit. First period prices and 
market shares are the same however second period prices are higher. This is intuitive. 
Product differentiation in the second period imparts some market power to the firms.  
Firms exploit this power by charging a higher price in equilibrium. A more subtle point is 
that the amount of switching in equilibrium is also higher. This is because now switching 
is driven by two factors. First, as before, by the second period poaching by rival firms 





2.3.2. Contract with Breach Penalty model: 
 Assume that contracts of the following form are available to the firms. In the first 
period, firm i can offer a contract which specifies a first period price, 1ip ; a second 
period price, iip ; and a breach penalty, iτ  which is to be paid by its first period customer 
if she leaves the firm in the second period. In the second period firm i can offer a new 
price, ijp , to the first period customers of the rival firm, j who switch to firm i. 
Proposition 5: 
If Contact with Breach Penalty (CWP) is available as an instrument then no strategies 
that involve not using CWP survive iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 
The proof is similar to that of proposition 2 given in the appendix. 
Proposition 6: 
There exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game where both firms use 
CWP and the strategies of each firm involves: 








































To illustrate the above proposition let us solve the game by backward induction. First 
consider second-period stage game. 
2.3.2a Second Period Competition. 
 The marginal first-period customer of firm A gets a realization of s and x such 
that, 
 ABAAA sxpxp τ++−+=+ )1(  





































 The above shaded region represents the A’s first period customers who switches to firm 
B in the second period, for a given the set of prices and penalty, ),,( ABAAA pp τ .  Firm B’s 




















































Similarly for firm B, the marginal first-period customer realizes, s and x such that, 
 BABBB sxpxp τ+++=−+ )1(  




































Figure 2.5. Competition in B’s first period customers market segment. 
 
Figure 2.5 shows the demand region for a typical set of prices and penalties, 
),,( BABBB pp τ . The shaded region represents customers, who switch to firm A in the 





















































 Now let us look at the second period maximization exercise of the two firms. 
Since the problem is symmetric we can look at firm A’s problem. A’s second period is 
given by: 
 [ ] ABABBAABAAAA qcpqqcp ))(1()1)((2 −−++−−= αταπ  
Firm A chooses ABp  to maximize it second period profit. Note that the first term 
comprises of profit from firm A’s first period customers who stay and rent (penalties) 
from those who leave A in the second period. This does not depend on its second period 
choice, ABp . A’s second period optimization can therefore be written as: 
 ABABAB ptrwqcp ..)max( −  





































At the proposed equilibrium, the optimal second period poaching price for firm A is 
9
2* += cpAB . It is easy to verify that this (given optimal penalty and optimal second 
period contract price of firm B) satisfies the first range above. In fact at the proposed 
equilibrium 
9
5*** −=− BABBB Bpp τ . This means that firm A finds it optimal not to 
completely subsidize the consumer of the switching penalty. Combined with the 
existence of the consumer specific inherent switching cost, s this in turn means that only 
consumers with very strong enough “dislike” of firm B and low enough switching cost 
will find it better-off to switch.  
Equilibrium Switching Outcome:  
At the proposed equilibrium we obtain positive switching as an equilibrium outcome. At 
the proposed equilibrium 
81
4* =ABq , i.e., close to one-twentieth of the first period 
customers of firm B switch to firm A in the second period. Since the equilibrium is 
symmetric the same amount switches from firm A to B. i.e., at the proposed equilibrium 
4/81 of the total market switches firms in the second period. So compared to the socially 
efficient switching amount there is too little switching in the equilibrium. The intuition is 
simple. When there is a second motivation for consumers to switch (other than just the 
price differential) it is no longer optimal to stop switching completely.  Some consumers 
are willing to pay high enough penalties and switch to the other firm even though the 




the firm finds it more profitable to let such consumers switch and earn the rent from the 
penalties rather than stop switching all together by charging a very high penalty. 
 
2.3.2b First Period Competition and optimal choice of contract: 
 First let us look at consumer’s choice of firms in the first period. A consumer will 
choose firm A over B if her expected surplus from choosing A in the first period is 
greater than that of choosing B. Expected surplus from choosing firm A in the first period 
is given by: 
 
{ }[ ]]|1[)()()|())(()( 1 switchsxEpvswitchprobstayxEpvstayprobpvEU ABAAAcAA +−−−−+−−+−= τδ
 
And that of choosing B is 
{ }[ ]]|[)()()|1())(()( 1 switchsxEpvswitchprobstayxEpvstayprobpvEU BABBBcBB +−−−+−−−+−= τδ
 
 Since all consumers are ex-ante identical A’s first period market share, 1=α  if 
BA EUEU >  and 0=α  if BA EUEU < . As before we make the assumption that all 
consumers choose A and B with equal probability if they get the same expected surplus 
from both firms, i.e., 
2
1
=α  if BA EUEU = . 
Now let us derive firm’s optimal choice. 
The two-period discounted profit for firm A can be written as: 













The first term is the first period profit and the second term is the discounted second 




second period profit from its first period customers’ base. The middle term is loss of 
profit less rent from penalties due to customers switching from A in the second period. 
This represents A’s net “loss” from B’s poaching on its first period customers.  The last 
term represent A’s profit from poaching on B’s first-period customers.  
 The proposed equilibrium strategy for firm A involves choosing 
FFA cvcp δδ 729
4)(1 −−−= , vpAA =  and 3
1
+−= cvAτ  in the first period. The 
explanation is as follows.  
 Firm A’s optimal penalty is chosen so as to maximize its second-period profit for any 
second period contract price AAp  and given that B’s second-period poaching price in A’s 
customer segment, BAp  is optimally chosen This results in the optimal penalty, 
3
1* +−= cpAAAτ . The derivation of the optimal penalty is given in the appendix. As long 
as firm A discounts the future less than consumers, cF δδ < , it would find it profitable to 
cross subsidize first period price, 1Ap  with second period price, AAp . So firm A charges 
the highest possible second period price, v . Since the problem is symmetric the same is 
true for firm B. Now consider the optimal choice of first period price by A.  At the 
proposed equilibrium the two period discounted profit for firm A shown above can be 
















4)( 1 ααδαπ cvcp FAA  
Note that the second term which represents second-period profit is increasing in first 
period market share. Firms compete for market share in the first period. This competition 




at least equal to Fδ729
8  by not competing in the first period and then poaching on B’s 
first period customers in the second period. So, competition in the first period prices 
drives down profit until equilibrium profit equals Fδ729
8 . The corresponding equilibrium 
first period price for firm A is, FFA cvcp δδ 729
4)(1 −−−= . Firm B charges the same 
price in equilibrium and the firms split the market in the first period. 














































Compared to the No CWP game, firms earn less profit in equilibrium. This is a classic 
prisoners’ dilemma. When CWP is available, firms find it privately optimal to use. But 
when all firms use it they are worse off than when no firms used it. Equilibrium 
switching is much lower with CWP than with no CWP. In fact it is even lower than the 






 Consumer poaching is a commonly observed business practice in subscription 
market with switching costs. Switching costs lock in firm’s customers and makes profit 
increasing in market share. Firms recognize this value of market share and compete 
vigorously in the first period. The consumer recognizes that once she is locked in, prices 
will be higher if she stays while the rival firm will offer inducements to switch 
(poaching). This makes first period demand very elastic and firms price below marginal 
costs in the first period. There is excessive switching in equilibrium. In certain industry 
firms use instruments to mitigate poaching by rivals. We examine the common practice in 
the US cell phone service industry of requiring customers to sign contracts for a specified 
length of time and early termination fees. Contracts with breach penalty has been used an 
instrument to mitigate consumer poaching by rival firms and has been seen by many as 
being disadvantageous to consumers by locking them in and that firms profit from using 
it. The above analysis finds that it is not the case. Contracts alter the structure of the game 
in two main ways.  First they make the switching cost endogenous through the provisions 
of early termination penalties. Second, they enable firms to commit to second period 
prices through the contracts. Firms can use the first feature to lock in customers by 
choosing high enough penalties. Consumers recognize this and demand even higher 
compensation in the first period to enter into the contract. Uncertainty of switching cost 
and product characteristics however restrict consumers from dissipating away all benefits 
of the lock-in from the firm. As a result, offering a contract becomes an optimal response 
for a firm. If rival firms are not using a contract, then other firm finds it better to use one. 
However first period competition in the market share yields lower profits for the firms 




  Areas for future research:  
In the above analysis we look at a two-period structure of the game where the length of 
the contract is exogenously given to the firms. This assumption, although a very useful 
one to answer our research question of how firms behave strategically when contracts are 
feasible, is a simplification. One possible extension of the research would be to allow for 
endogenous contract length to study the choice of optimal length of contracts. This is 
particularly an interesting topic, which relates directly to the number portability issue. 
Beginning late 2003, the cell-phone industry allowed number portability where customers 
can take their old numbers when they switch service providers. Prior to that, customers 
have to get a new number if they switch providers. The act was resisted by service 
providers for some time because it imposed additional costs to them. When finally, 
portability was introduced most providers simultaneously increased the length of the 
contracts (from usually one year to two years). Two things happened.  Number portability 
shifted the distribution of the exogenous random switching costs faced by consumers.  It 
also increased the marginal costs of the providers.  It would be very interesting to see 
how firms choose the optimal length of the contract and how this length is affected by a 
















Strategic Complementarities and the Incentive to 




The US wholesale market for unbranded16 gasoline exhibits considerable price 
dispersion both across different regional wholesale markets known as city terminals17 and 
also within a typical regional wholesale market (i.e., within a city-terminal). This price 
dispersion is observed at two apparently different levels.  
First, there is considerable variation in the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline 
charged by different refiners in the same city-terminal.  For instance, in the third week of 
August 1999, the average spread of the wholesale price of unbranded gasoline in a city 
terminal was 6.1 cents for regular unleaded gasoline. On average this amounts to around 
8% of the mean terminal prices.  
                                                 
16 Unbranded gasoline is generic gasoline that does not carry any major brand name, like Shell or BP. 
Chemically and physically, unbranded gasoline sold by different refiners is a homogeneous product. 
17 A city terminal is a storage and distribution facility that serves as the local wholesale market for gasoline 




Second, there is also significant variation in the price of unbranded gasoline charged 
by the same refiner in different city-terminals. For example, the price of unbranded 
regular unleaded gasoline charged by Marathon Petroleum, a major refiner that operates 
in nearly a hundred city-terminals during our sample period, at the Convent/Garyville 
city terminal in Louisiana was 54.65 cents per gallon. At the Columbus city-terminal in 
Ohio the price charged by Marathon was 71.84 cents per gallon, around 15 cents higher! 
The average price charged by Marathon during the period was 63.2 cents with a standard 
deviation of 4.4. 
Unbranded gasoline is physically a homogeneous product. Transportation cost 
imparts product differentiation to unbranded gasoline sold by refiners at different 
terminals.  But the prices of unbranded gasoline charged by the same refiner at different 
terminals vary by much more than that could be attributable to transportation cost18. 
In this paper we analyze the price dispersion in the wholesale market for unbranded 
gasoline and attempt to provide an explanation based on the pricing decision of two 
different types of firms in the market, viz. refiners that sell only unbranded gasoline at a 
terminal and refiners that also sell branded gasoline at the terminal. The economic 
motivation derives from internalizing strategic complementarities of prices by a firm that 
sells more than one product in the market. Products are said to be strategic 
complements19 in prices if an increase in price of one increases the marginal profitability 
of an increase in price of the other product . Unbranded gasoline and branded gasoline are 
strategic complements in prices. A refiner that sells both branded and unbranded gasoline 
                                                 
18 Gasoline can be transported over large distances for a cost of 1-2 cents per gallon by pipelines or barges. 
Gilbert and Hastings (2005) 
19 J. Bulow, J. Geanakoplos, and P. Klemperer, “ Multimarket Oligopoly: Strategic Substitutes and 




internalizes these strategic complementarities when optimally choosing its prices. This 
result in higher price for unbranded gasoline by a refiner that sells both the products 
compared to that of a refiner that sells only unbranded gasoline.   
The chapter is organized in the following sections. Section 3.2 develops a simple 
model to describe how a firm that sells more than one product in a market where the 
products are strategic complements, internalizes the complementarities in choosing its 
optimal prices which leads it to choose a higher price for its product compared to a 
similar firm which sells only one product. Section 3.3 provides a brief description of the 
US wholesale market for gasoline and outlines the hypotheses that we aim to test for the 
wholesale market for unbranded gasoline.  The detailed description of the data and the 
results of the empirical exercises are given in section 3.4.  Section 3.5 concludes. 
We perform two types of empirical exercises depending on the scope of the data 
available. The first exercise is for the whole set of refiners (firms) selling wholesale 
unbranded gasoline in the United States and for all city terminals located in the United 
States in the time period of our analysis. For this dataset we only have information on 
whether a refiner sells only unbranded gasoline (one product) or both unbranded and 
branded gasoline (two products) but no additional information on the market shares of the 
refiners.. The main result of this exercise is that refiners that sell both unbranded and 
branded gasoline at a city terminal charge a higher price for unbranded gasoline 
compared to refiners that sell only unbranded gasoline. 
The second empirical exercise is done for a major refiner, Marathon Petroleum, 




augmented with the share20 of Marathon brand retail stations. This share is a proxy for 
the market share of Marathon’s branded gasoline. Marathon has retail brand presence in a 
little more than half of the 99 markets (city terminals) where it sells wholesale unbranded 
gasoline. The main results of this empirical exercise are the following. First, we find that 
Marathon charges a significantly higher price for unbranded gasoline in those markets 
where it also sells branded gasoline (i.e., has retail brand presence).  This result is similar 
to the result obtained from first exercise. Second, the share of Marathon brand retail 
stations has a positive and significant impact on the price Marathon charges for 
unbranded gasoline. This suggests that the gain from internalizing the strategic 
complementarities is higher the higher is the market share of the second product. Third, 
in a non-linear specification of the reduced form estimation, we find that the price of 
unbranded gasoline charged by Marathon is concave in the share of its branded retail 
stations. Finally, we find that the number of refiners selling unbranded gasoline in the 
wholesale market has a negative and significant impact on the price of unbranded 
gasoline charged by Marathon. This result is expected and confirms the commonly held 
view  that competition at the wholesale level is important for keeping prices low. 
The conclusions and possible extensions are given in section 5. 
 
3.2. The Model. 
 Let us look at a simple model to motivate the analysis 
3.2.1 Case I. 
                                                 
20   By share here, we mean the share retail stations selling Marathon Brand gasoline to the total number of 
retail stations in the market. This is a proxy measure for the market share of Marathon Brand Gasoline at 




 First, as a benchmark case, consider three firms BandAA 21 ,  located at the 
corners of the unit square as shown in the figure 1.  With a slight abuse of notation let 
BandAA 21 ,  respectively denote the products of the three firms as well. BandA1  are 
horizontally differentiated products while 2A  is vertically differentiated from the other 
two products while co-locating  with 1A  along the horizontal dimension. The assumption 
of vertical differentiation is not necessary for our analysis. Horizontal differentiation 
suffices. This assumption, however, apart from simplifying our modeling exercise is a 
natural fit to the industry that we analyze in the empirical section, viz., the gasoline 
industry where there is a natural vertical differentiation in the form of branded and 
unbranded gasoline. 
  Suppose that buyers’ preferences are distributed uniformly over the unit square. 
Each buyer receives a common indirect utility, v from consuming one unit of any of the 
three products. Furthermore a buyer located at (x, y) receives an additional utility of y if 
she buys the high quality product, 2A .   She also incurs a transportation cost of x if she 
buys either 21 AorA  and a cost of (1-x) if she buys B.  Assume that the common indirect 
utility, v is high enough that everyone buys at least one unit in the equilibrium. 
Let the prices of BandAA 21 , be BAA pandpp 21 ,  respectively. We can now derive the 
demands for each of the products. There are three margins to consider: the marginal 
buyers between 21 AandA , those between BandA1  and those between BandA2 . It is 
easy to verify that the marginal buyers with realization *y  are indifferent between 
21 AandA  where 12
*
AA ppy −= . Similarly the marginal buyers with realization 
*x  are 









AB ppx −+=  
Now consider the marginal buyers between BandA2 . Consider a buyer with realization 
(x,y). If she purchases 2A  she derives a net indirect utility of xpyv A −−+ 2  and if she 
purchases B, a net utility of )1( xpv B −−− . The marginal buyers between BandA2  
have realization )~,~( yx  such that  
  )~1(~~
2
xpvxpyv BA −−−=−−+  
i.e.,  
2
1~~2 AB ppyx −+=−  












Figure 3.1.  Product locations and Demand regions. 
 

























 Assume that the marginal cost of BandA1  is zero and that of 2A  is 0≥c .  For 
the purpose of our analysis of strategic complementarities of prices we do not need for c 
to be strictly greater than zero.  
  Each firm chooses its price to maximize profit taking other firms’ prices and cost 
as given. Firm 1A ’s profit is given by: 


























Maximizing equation (1) with respect to 
!A
p  yields the following first order condition: 
 ( ) )2(0)1(123
2211
2 =++++− BABAAA pppppp  
The second order sufficient condition for a maximum is satisfied if the following holds at 
the candidate equilibrium solution. 
 ( ) )3(0126
21
<++− BAA ppp  
 
Similarly, Firm 2A ’s profit is given by: 
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Differentiating equation (4) with respect to 2Ap  yields the first order condition given 
below: 




and the second order sufficient condition at the candidate solution is given below: 
 ( ) )6(02246 2 <++− cpp BA  
 
Firm B’s profit is given by: 
















The first order condition is found by differentiating above with respect to Bp . 





112 AAAAB ppppp −−++=  
The second order sufficient condition is  always satisfied21. 
 
Now the three first order conditions, i.e., equations (2), (5) and (8) can be solved 
simultaneously to get the equilibrium prices. Note that the first order conditions are 
quadratic equations (the third equation is linear in Bp ) and cannot be solved by hand. We 
solve these equations using MATLAB’s symbolic math tool. The codes and the set of 
resulting candidate solutions are shown in the appendix.  For each value of c small 
enough, we obtain a unique solution that satisfies the second order conditions after 
eliminating complex and negative roots. For example if c equals zero, then the unique 
solution that maximizes the firms’ profits is given by: 
 { } )9(472.0,563.0,250.0 ** 2*1 appp BAA ===  
Similarly for 1.0=c  the unique solution is  
                                                 













 { } )9(491.0,632.0,276.0 ** 2*1 bppp BAA ===  
It is easy to verify that the above solutions indeed satisfy the second order conditions. 
 
3.2.2 Case II: 
 Now let us consider the case where the products 21 AandA  are both sold by the 
same firm, say A. The motivation of this exercise is the central part of the paper. Firm A 
now chooses two prices, 21 AA pandp  to maximize its joint profit from the two market 
segments (i.e., its two products). Note that prices are strategic complements.  When 
optimally choosing a price of one of its product, Firm A internalizes this strategic effect 
from the other product resulting in higher equilibrium prices. In particular, relevant to the 
empirical exercise that follows, we expect to find that the equilibrium price of 1A  is 
higher when both 21 AandA  are sold by the same firm than when they are sold by 
separate firms. 
 Assume that there is no change in the preferences and cost. Then the demands for 
the products remain unchanged. See Figure 1 above. Firm B’s maximization exercise 
given other prices, 21 AA pandp  also remains unchanged. Firm A maximizes its joint 
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Partially differentiating equation (10) with respect to 1Ap  and 2Ap  respectively yields the 
following first order conditions: 
( ) ( ) ( ) )11(01123223: 1221211 =−+−++++− ABBAABAAA ppcppppppp
 
and  
( ) ( ) ( ) )12(0232142433: 21221222 =−+++++++−− ABBBABAAAA ppcpppppppp
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 For firm B the maximization exercise remains unchanged and consequently we 
have the same first order condition, i.e., equation (8) 





112 AAAAB ppppp −−++=  
 We can now get the equilibrium prices by solving the first order conditions 
simultaneously. We solve equations (11), (12) and (8) using MATLAB. Here again we 
obtain unique interior solutions satisfying second order conditions for c close to zero after 
eliminating complex and negative roots. For example, the unique solutions for 





























We can easily verify that the second order conditions are satisfied22. 
We are now ready to compare the equilibrium prices in the two cases analyzed above.  
Compare the equilibrium prices given in (9a) and (9b) to the ones found in (13a) and 
(13b). Note that the equilibrium prices are higher in the second case when firm A sells 
both 21 AandA  than when they were sold by separate firms. This result will likely hold 
for all values of c close to zero. It does hold for all values of c that we checked 
numerically. Table B.0 shows the equilibrium prices of the two cases for some  values of 
c close to zero.  The intuition is simple. Prices are strategic complements. An increase in 
price of 1A  has the effect of increasing the demand for 2A  and marginal profitability 
from raising the price of 2A , which in turn raises the price of 2A  and vice versa. When a 
single firm sells both 21 AandA , it internalizes this strategic complementarities effect 
resulting in higher equilibrium prices.  
 
3.3. A brief description of the US Gasoline Wholesale Market. 
A stylized illustration of the production and distribution of gasoline in the United 
States is shown in Figure 1. Gasoline consumed in the United States is either produced by 
domestic refiners or imported. Domestic production accounts for 65 % of the total 
                                                 
22 For 0=c the second order conditions are weakly satisfied. We can find unique solution satisfying the 




gasoline consumption of the United States. Refiners may be classified into two types: 
Majors and Independent refiners.  
Majors are large companies such as BP, Exxon, Chevron and Marathon, who, among 
other things, are integrated in the distribution and marketing of gasoline and have a brand 
presence in the retail markets in many cities. Independent refiners, such as Western 
Refining, Navajo, etc. specialize only in the refining aspect and are not involved in 
marketing. After production (or on arrival in case of imports) gasoline is transported from 
the refineries and coastal areas to distribution and storage facilities called “Terminals” 
which are located near large cities in metropolitan areas. The city terminal serves as the 
wholesale market for the supply of gasoline to retail stations located in and around the 
city within the metropolitan area, the sellers being the refiners and the buyers, the retail 
gas stations. There are two types of gasoline sold in the terminals: “Branded” and 
“Unbranded”. Branded gasoline refers to gasoline sold by a major refiner such as Exxon, 
BP or Chevron under its brand name and resold at branded retail stations under the same 
brand name. Unbranded gasoline is generic gasoline that does not carry any major brand 
name and are sold at the terminals by both Independent refiners and Majors. Many 
Majors sell part of their gasoline as unbranded gasoline without permission to use the 
refiners’ brand name at retail. In fact there is quite a few number of city terminals where 
a Major sells only unbranded gasoline. These terminals correspond to metropolitan areas 





























Figure 3.2. US Gasoline Industry Structure23 
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On the demand side of the wholesale market we have the retail gas stations. They 
can be classified into two broad types corresponding to the two types of gasoline 
discussed above. They are the branded retail stations and the unbranded stations. Branded 
retail stations can only sell its brand of gasoline and cannot sell other brands or 
unbranded gasoline. This means, for example, a Shell retail station can only purchase the 
Shell brand gasoline from the city terminal. Even though in the long run a retail gas 
station can change the brand of gasoline it carries or even change to an unbranded 
gasoline station, there is a significant sunk cost to do so in the short run, e.g. it is usual 
for branded retail stations to sign a contract with the major refiner whose brand for a pre-
specified period of time.  For this reason, in the short run there is little competition 
among the refiners in the upstream wholesale market (Terminal) in the branded segment. 
Furthermore a typical branded retail station can be one of three types, wholly owned by 
the major refiner, a lessee-dealer or an independent dealer. However regardless of the 
ownership type, they are contractually bound to sell the refiner’s brand gasoline.  
On the other hand unbranded retail stations sell unbranded gasoline purchased 
from either the independent refiners or the majors in the city terminals.  This market is 
very competitive as unbranded gasoline is a homogeneous product and there are no 
contractual restrictions on the retail stations to purchase it from a particular refiner. We 
therefore focus our empirical analysis on the price competition in the wholesale market 
for unbranded gasoline. The sellers in this market can be classified into two functional 
categories: those who sell only unbranded gasoline in the terminal and those who sell 




major refiners, the first type comprises of independent refiners and also those majors who 
only sell unbranded gasoline in that terminal (corresponding to those majors that do not 
have a brand presence at retail in the area).  
Branded and unbranded gasoline are strategic complements in prices at the retail 
market. The seller type who sells both branded and unbranded internalizes these strategic 
complementarities. Thus all else equal we would expect that refiners that sell both 
branded and unbranded gasoline in a terminal would want to charge a higher price for 
unbranded gasoline than those that sell only unbranded.  
However there are factors that work to weaken or strengthen this effect. First, the 
extent to which an increase in the price of unbranded gasoline increases profit in the 
branded segment depends on the demand for the refiner’s branded gasoline, hence on 
market share of the refiner’s branded gasoline at retail. The higher is the market share the 
greater is its gain from this strategic effect. Conversely, if the market share of its branded 
gasoline is small the refiner will have less incentive to raise the price in the unbranded 
market because the loss in profit in the unbranded segment would be offset by a smaller 
gain in profit in the branded segment.   
Secondly, whether the refiner will be able to raise the price of unbranded gasoline 
in the wholesale market depends on its market power and the competition in the 
unbranded wholesale market. If there are a large number of refiners in the market then we 
should expect that competition would dominate the strategic effect. Conversely we 
should expect to see a stronger effect on price due to strategic complementarities when 





3.4. Evidence from US wholesale Market for Unbranded Gasoline: Data and 
Empirical Estimation 
Data of unbranded wholesale gasoline prices was obtained from Oil Price 
Information Service (OPIS). The price data is the weekly average terminal rack prices of 
unbranded regular unleaded gasoline posted by the refiners at a terminal at two time 
periods, a high demand period (third week of August 1999) and a low demand period 
(third week of January 2000) for all the terminals located in the 50 states of United 
States. Prices are in cents per gallon. Apart from prices the data also include the unique 
refiner names, the location of terminals where the refiners operate (city and State) and an 
identifier whether the refiner also sells branded gasoline in that particular terminal. There 
were 78 refiners24 in 300 terminals25 selling unbranded wholesale gasoline during that 
time period. Out of these 78 refiners selling unbranded gasoline 19 sell branded gasoline 
as well in at least one terminal while the remaining refiners sell only unbranded gasoline 
in all the terminals they operate. Many of these refiners, mainly the major refiners, sell in 
more than one terminal and there may exist some competition across terminals. But since 
the terminals are far apart from one another and because of the presence of significant 
transportation costs, we expect the inter-terminal competition to be of a second order. We 
therefore treat a terminal as a single independent market and as a consequence we treat a 
refiner who operates in two terminals as different firms for the purpose of their profit 
maximization in each terminal. 
 We perform two types of empirical exercises based on the scope of the data 
available. The first exercise is for the whole set of refiners selling unbranded gasoline in 
                                                 
24 See table B.2 in the appendix for a complete list of refiners selling unbranded gasoline. 




the United States and for all city terminals located in the United States in the time period 
of our analysis. For all refiners that sell unbranded gasoline in any terminal we can 
identify whether they also sell branded gasoline in that particular terminal. We can 
therefore identify which refiners have a strategic incentive to raise the price of their 
unbranded gasoline. However we do not have information on the number or market share 
of retail stations selling that refiner’s brand gasoline.  
In our analysis we make the assumption that in the short run a refiner chooses 
prices only and does not choose whether to sell both types of gasoline or just one type in 
a terminal. In other words, we take the type and the distribution of the types of refiners as 
given. This choice may be endogenous to the refiners. There may be factors unique to 
some terminals or markets that facilitate a refiner to sell both types of gasoline. The same 
factors may also affect price choice. If that were the case then we would have 
endogeneity problems in our estimation and we would have to find good instruments. 
However for our case our assumption that this choice is exogenous in the short run seems 
to be a reasonable one.  As mentioned before a refiner that sells branded gasoline at a 
terminal has brand presence at retail in the local markets served by the terminal. This 
means there has to exist retail gas stations, either company owned, franchises or 
independent dealers selling the refiners brand gasoline. This involves either buying and 
operating the stations in the case of company owned, or making initial investments in 
business format and infrastructure for the case of franchises or signing contracts with the 
independent dealers. There has to be a network for distribution of branded gasoline to the 
station as well. So even though in the long run refiners do make the choice of whether to 




which is a sunk cost in the short run. Therefore in the short run analysis of price choice in 
our case it is reasonable to assume that the market structure is exogenous to the choice of 
price. 
We create a dummy variable that equals one if a refiner also sells branded 
gasoline in that terminal. We regress the price of unbranded gasoline on the dummy after 
controlling for various factors including competition factors within a terminal as 
measured by the number of sellers in the terminal for unbranded as well as branded 
gasoline, city-terminal fixed effects and dummies for major brand refiners that sell 
unbranded gasoline.  
The US petroleum industry is divided into five broad regions called the Petroleum 
Administration for Defense Districts26 (PADDs). These are PADD1 (East Coast), 
PADD2 (Midwest), PADD3 (Gulf Coast), PADD4 (Rocky Mountain), PADD5 (West 
Coast). Each of these regions is different in terms of production and consumption of 
gasoline27.  To control for these regional effects we include dummies for PADDs in our 
regression. 
In order to control for changes in demand and supply of gasoline within each of 
the PADD, changes in stocks of gasoline are computed for each region and included in 
the regression. The data on stock is available from EIA for each of the PADDs. The  % 
change in gasoline stock for both periods is computed as the difference in stock between 
the third and second week divided by the stock in the second week times 100.  
                                                 
26 See figure B.1  in the appendix  for  the detailed map of PADDs. Source: Energy Information 
Administration 




The results of the regression are shown in Table 3.1. The dependent variable is 
price  of unbranded gasoline of regular-unleaded grade28 posted by refiners at the city-
terminals. Note that the coefficient on the dummy for a refiner selling branded gasoline 
as well at that terminal is positive and highly significant at both time periods.   For 
example, in the high demand period (August 1999), all else equal, a refiner who also sells 
branded gasoline charges 2.3 cents more for its unbranded gasoline than one that sells 
only unbranded gasoline. With an average price of unbranded gasoline around 70 cents, 
this amounts to a 3.3 % higher price due to the strategic effect. The corresponding figure 
for the low demand period (January 2000) is around 3.1%. 
The results lend support to our prediction of the incentive to raise price due to 
strategic complementarities that exist for a firm that sell both unbranded and branded 
gasoline. The intuition is simple.  A higher price in the unbranded market segment 
increases demand for the branded product. A refiner that sells both branded and 
unbranded gasoline internalizes this strategic effect when optimally choosing the price. 
 
                                                 











# of unbranded Sellers (in a terminal) -0.42 -1.186
[0.632] [1.204]
# of Branded Sellers (in a terminal) 0.032 1.165
[0.473] [1.103]


























Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Dependent Variable is Price of Unbranded Regular Unleaded Gasoline.        Controls for major 
brands selling unbranded gasoline included in the regression.Terminal(city) Fixed effects  
included.Dummies for PADDs included
Dummy for a seller who sells both branded and 




However the incentive to raise price by a refiner selling both unbranded and 
unbranded gasoline will depend on the payoff from doing so. The strategic incentive to 
raise the price of its unbranded gasoline therefore will depend on how much of the loss of 
demand from its unbranded segment due to the higher price is absorbed by it branded 
segment. This would in turn depend on the market share of its branded gasoline.   All else 
equal a higher market share of its branded gasoline would mean a bigger gain from a unit 
increase in the price of its unbranded gasoline. To analyze that, we turn to the next 
empirical exercise. 
The second empirical exercise is done for a major refiner, Marathon Petroleum, 
which sells unbranded gasoline in 99 city terminals located in 23 states concentrated in 
the Midwest, Upper Great Plains, Gulf Coast and Southeast regions of the United States. 
The company ranks as the fifth-largest29 crude oil refiner in the United States and the 
largest in the Midwest.    
First, Marathon has brand presence in the retail market, either in the form of 
company owned stations, franchises or independent dealers selling the Marathon brand 
gasoline, in over half of the cities where the terminals are located. Marathon Petroleum 
sells both branded and unbranded gasoline in these terminals (and in the remaining city 
terminals Marathon sells only unbranded gasoline).  In these markets Marathon has a 
strategic incentive to raise its prices for unbranded gasoline. So we expect Marathon to 
charge a higher price for unbranded gasoline in these terminals.  
Second, in the markets where Marathon has brand presence there is considerable 
variance in the market share of Marathon retail stations, the highest being close to 41% of 
                                                 




total retail stations. We expect the strategic incentive to charge a higher price to be 
stronger in markets where Marathon has a bigger market share in retail.  
Third, the share of company owned stations also vary across the markets. If 
company owned stations are strategically different from franchises and independent 
stations, then we would observe a significant effect on price due to share of company 
owned stations. On the other hand if the two types of stations are strategically similar 
from Marathon’s perspective we should not observe any additional effect due to the share 
of company owned stations.  We can exploit this variance to test for the effect of the 
share of company owned stations on wholesale prices unbranded gasoline. 
Fourth, even when the strategic incentive to raise price is present, the ability and 
the extent to which Marathon can do so depends on the level of competition in the 
terminal. If there are a large number of refiners selling unbranded gasoline in a terminal, 
the demand for Marathon’s unbranded gasoline will be quite elastic. So we expect to 
observe a negative effect of the number of sellers on the price Marathon charges. 
  Data on the prices of unbranded gasoline charged by Marathon at the wholesale 
terminals were obtained from Oil Price Information Service (OPIS). The price data is the 
weekly average terminal rack prices of two grades of unbranded gasoline; regular 
unleaded and Premium gasoline, posted by Marathon in the terminals it operates during 
the period of August 1999. Prices are in cents per gallon.  Apart from the data on prices, 
the OPIS dataset also has information on the unique location of the terminals30 (city and 
state) and the number of refiners in a terminal selling unbranded gasoline.  
                                                 





The data on the number of retail stations selling Marathon brand gasoline was 
obtained from Marathon Petroleum Company. These retail stations are wholly owned by   
Marathon, franchised or owned by independent dealers selling marathon brand gasoline. 
The wholly company owned stations are marketed under the chain names Speedway and 
Super America. There are around 1500 Speedway and Super America stores, almost all in 
the Midwest states.  The locations of these stations are found in the Speedway website. In 
addition to the company owned stations there are around 3000 retail stations comprising 
of both franchises and independent dealers selling Marathon brand gasoline selling. The 
location of these remaining stations, were obtained from the Marathon Petroleum 
website. The addresses contain city, state and zip. We identify the Metropolitan 
Statistical Areas (MSA) where the retail stations are located. This is done by first 
identifying the county locations of all the retail stations and then matching them up with 
the MSA county definition of the Census Bureau. We obtain the market share of 
Marathon brand at retail as the percentage of Marathon retail stations to the total number 
of gas stations in the MSA. The data on total number of gas stations in MSAs are 
obtained from the economic census published by the Census Bureau. We then match the 
data on the number of Marathon retail stations with the wholesale price data by the 
common MSA where the wholesale terminal and the retail stations are located.  
Demand, cost and market factors vary from one city terminal to the other. We 
need to control for these factors in order to sensibly perform cross terminal analysis. We 
use population (log), per capita personal income (demand factors), average wage (cost 




PADD31s (market factors) as controls. Data on population, per capita personal income 
and average wages were obtained from the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). BEA’s 
Regional Economic Information Service (REIS) has detailed data at the MSA level of the 
above variables. In order to control for changes in demand and supply of gasoline within 
each of the PADD, changes in stocks of gasoline are computed for each region and 
included in the regression. The data on stock is available from EIA for each of the 
PADDs. The % change in gasoline stock is computed as the difference in stock between 
the third and second week of August 1999 divided by the stock in the second week times 
100.  
 
We regress the price of unbranded gasoline charged by Marathon at the terminals on a 
dummy for whether Marathon has brand presence at retail (i.e., sells branded gasoline as 
well), the share of Marathon retail stations to total retail stations, the share of wholly 
company-owned Marathon Stations after controlling for the demand, cost and 
competition factors discussed above. The results of the regressions are shown in Table 
3.2. The dependent variables in the two columns are prices of two grades of unbranded 
gasoline; regular unleaded gasoline and premium gasoline respectively, that were posted 
by Marathon at the terminals during the third week of August 199932. 
 
                                                 
31The US petroleum industry is divided into five broad regions called the Petroleum Administration for 
Defense Districts (PADDs). These are PADD1 (East Coast), PADD2  (Midwest), PADD3 (Gulf Coast), 
PADD4 (Rocky Mountain), PADD5 (West Coast). See appendix for a map of the PADDs. Each of these 
regions are different in terms of production and consumption of gasoline.  Marathon terminal are located 
only in the first three PADDs: PADD1, PADD2 and PADD3. To control for these regional effects we 
include dummies for PADDs in our regression. 
 
 






Table 3. 2.  
 
 
Note that the coefficient on the dummy for brand presence is positive and 
significant. This result is similar to that obtained in the first exercise.  For instance at the 
margin the price of unbranded gasoline charged by Marathon for regular-unleaded 
gasoline is around 2 cents higher in terminals where it has brand presence at retail. The 
corresponding figure is just above 2 cents for premium unbranded gasoline. Further, the 













Average Wage -0.000* -0.000**
[0.000] [0.000]
Per capita personal Income 0 0.000*
[0.000] [0.000]








Robust standard errors in brackets
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Percentage of company-owned Marathon 
stations to total retail stations Interacted 
with Dummy, D1
D1:Dummy=1 if Marathon Brand  Retail 
Stations present
Percentage of Marathon Stations to Total 




of unbranded gasoline charged by Marathon..  It supports our hypothesis that the strategic 
incentive to raise price of one product is higher the higher is the market share of the 
second product.  Note however that after controlling for the share of Marathon brand 
retail stations, the share of company owned stations does not have a significant impact on 
the price of unbranded gasoline. This is quite an interesting result. It supports the 
hypothesis that the company-owned stations are not strategically different from other 
retail stations selling Marathon brand gasoline from the perspective of Marathon’s 
incentive to raise price due to the strategic complementarities. Finally, the number of 
refiners selling unbranded gasoline in a terminal has a negative and significant impact on 
the price charged by Marathon.  This is expected. It underscores the importance of 
competition for keeping prices low. 
 
In the above specification we assumed a linear relationship between the price of 
marathon’s unbranded gasoline and the share of retail stations its brand gasoline.  In the 
following estimation we relax that assumption and allow for a non-linear relationship. 
We consider two specifications.  The first is a quadratic specification, where we include 
the squared share as an additional regressor.  In the second specification, we include 
indicator variables for consecutive non-overlapping intervals of the shares.  The results 
are shown in Table 3.3. 
The results are qualitatively similar to the last set of results. We find that the price 
of unbranded gasoline charged by Marathon is increasing and concave in the share of its 
brand retail stations. That the price is increasing in the market share is similar to the 




although the effect of internalizing strategic complementarities is increasing in the market 
share of branded gasoline, it is increasing at a diminishing rate. However compared to 
Table 3.2 we find that the coefficient of the dummy for markets where Marathon has 
brand presence at retail is smaller in magnitude and less significant or insignificant at the 
































-0.192*** -0.204** -0.172*** -0.183*
[0.067] [0.096] [0.064] [0.092]
0.117 0.523*** 0.103 0.514***
[0.101] [0.102] [0.099] [0.103]
Log(population) -0.293 -0.332 -0.384 -0.432
[0.315] [0.412] [0.298] [0.397]
Average Wage -0.000** 0 -0.000** 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Per capita personal Income 0.000* 0 0.000** 0
[0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
 % Change in gasoline stocks (in PADDs) 0.545* 0.605* 0.751* 0.811**
[0.308] [0.325] [0.385] [0.399]
PADD2 -0.659 -0.607 -0.952 -0.925
[0.693] [0.970] [0.721] [0.983]
Constant 66.389*** 67.044*** 70.621*** 71.377***
[2.491] [3.421] [2.423] [3.381]
Observations 99 99 99 99
R-squared 0.92 0.85 0.92 0.85
Robust standard errors in brackets
+ significant at 15%; * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Regular Unleaded Premium
Percentage of company-owned Marathon 
stations to total retail stations Interacted 
with Dummy, D1
# of unbranded Sellers (in a  city terminal)
D1:Dummy=1 if Marathon Brand  Retail 
Stations present
Percentage of Marathon Stations to Total 
retail Stations interacted with dummy, D1
Square of Percentage of Marathon 
Stations to Total retail Stations interacted 
with dummy, D1
Dummy=1 if % of Marathon Brand stations 
0<x<=10
Dummy=1 if % of Marathon Brand stations 
10<x<=20





This is not inconsistent with earlier results. The difference is due to the linear 
approximation of the quadratic specification which turns out to be concave. The first 
dummy is significant at the 10% level for premium grade and at 15% for regular 
unleaded grade. In theory a specification test (for example the likelihood ratio test) of the 
linear model against the quadratic model could possibly allow us to choose the model of 
best fit. However the small number of observations in our case severely limits the 
accuracy of such a test and it would be dangerous to infer from one. Interestingly, the 
result from the quadratic specification implies that at very low market share the effect of 
internalizing strategic complementarities is small, which is not unreasonable to expect. 
 
3.5. Conclusions. 
We looked at the incentive for a firm to raise prices when it sells more than one 
product and when there exist strategic complementarities in prices among the products. 
We empirically examine whether this incentive indeed leads to higher wholesale prices 
for unbranded gasoline in the US by those refiners that sells also sell branded gasoline in 
the same market. The empirical analysis lends support to the hypothesis that firms that 
sells products that are strategic complements internalizes this effect when optimally 
choosing prices and may lead to higher prices. 
We then focus on a major refiner, Marathon Petroleum that sells unbranded 
gasoline in ninety-nine wholesale markets allowing us to control for refiner specific 
idiosyncrasies. It is particularly interesting because Marathon’s market share of its 




confirm that the incentive to raise price of one product increases with the market share of 
the second product. 
 The empirical evidence of the proposed theory of internalizing strategic 
complementarities is quite strong. However there may be other alternative theories that 
may in part explain the price dispersion observed for unbranded gasoline. First, there may 
be intangible differences in the quality of services offered by the majors and independent 
refiners that gets reflected in the observed price variation. Brand dummies included in the 
estimation should control for this effect. Moreover the second analysis precludes this 
effect since we look at just one refiner. 
Secondly, it could be that refiners that also sell branded gasoline at a terminal 
have big market shares and the other refiners are fringe firms. So the former are the price 
leaders and the other refiners follow the prices set by them. Or alternatively, refiners that 
post high prices at a terminal do not sell any or sell very little unbranded gasoline.  If the 
price of branded gasoline is indexed directly to the price of unbranded gasoline sold by 
the same refiner then the refiner has the incentive to post a higher price for its unbranded 
gasoline even if it does not sell any or sell very little unbranded gasoline. Then we may 
observe the systematic price variation even without the effect of strategic 
complementarities at retail. However, this doesn’t seem the likely explanation for two 
reasons. First, there seem to be little evidence that refiners tie their branded price to the 
price of their unbranded gasoline. In fact the pricing of branded gasoline follows complex 
rules and guidelines known as zoning and redlining which has very little to do with 
unbranded wholesale price but rather with the prices of branded gasoline  the refiner 




shows that this price variation correlates positively with the share of branded gasoline. 
This supports the strategic complementarities explanation rather than the above 
explanation. 
Finally, the data is limited by the lack of information on sales volume of the 
refiners at the wholesale markets. This precluded direct tests of whether the refiners 
posting higher prices are indeed market leaders in the unbranded segment or alternatively 
are those that sell very little of none at all. It would be interesting to test for further 
evidence in the gasoline industry with a more comprehensive dataset. 
Alternatively, it would be very interesting to see if we can find similar evidence in 
other markets with similar structure, for example, the pharmaceutical industry where 














Appendix to Chapter 2. 
 
 
Proofs of Propositions 
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1. 
Proposition 1. 
 There exists a unique subgame perfect equilibrium of the game. The subgame 











and in the second period each firm chooses prices iip  and ijp  optimally as described in 
the previous section. 
Proof: 
 We have shown the optimal second period prices for each firm, given the rival 
firm’s prices and hence the  proposed strategies constitute a Nash equilibrium in the 
second stage subgame. We need only check for possible profitable deviations in the first 
period  subgame. We have also shown that the equilibrium two-period discounted profit  






























If a firm deviates to any first period price higher than 
3
Fc δ− , it does not sell any in the 
first period and therefore poaching its customers in the second period is not possible. It 
only engages in poaching the rival firm’s customers. And its two-period discounted profit 
is 
9
Fδ . Hence it can not do better by deviating to a price higher than 
3
Fc δ− . 
Now suppose it deviates to any price lower than 
3
Fc δ− , say 0,
3
>−− εε
δ Fc . It sells 
to all customers in the first period, i.e., its first period market share is 1 and its two-period 


























⎛ −−−= . 
Hence the proposed strategies indeed consitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. 
Uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium: 
 Suppose there exist another symmetric equilibrium pair of first period prices, ( )11 , BA pp . 
They can either be higher than or lower than
3









+F . This cannot be an equilibrium because A can lower its first period price by 
just a little, (by less than
2




+− Fc  and capture the entire market in the first 














BA cpp . The two-period discounted profit will be, 
29
εδ
−F . This cannot be an equilibrium either because A can deviate to a slightly higher 




 A.2  Proof of Proposition 2 
Proposition 2:  
If Contact with Breach Penalty (CWP) is available as an instrument then no strategies 
that involve not using CWP survives iterative elimination of weakly dominated strategies. 
Proof: 
Since the problem is symmetric we need only show for one firm, say A. First let us 
suppose firm B does not use CWP. We show that firm A can do better by using CWP 
than any strategies that involve not using CWP when firm B chooses prices optimally. 
2nd –Period Subgame: 
The marginal first period customer of firm A who is indifferent between staying with A 
or switching to B gets a second period realization of the random switching cost, s 
yielding the following demands in A first period customers segment. 
 BAAAAABA ppsq −−== τ  
And , 
 BAAAABAAA ppqq ++−=−= τ11  
Since B doesn’t use CWP we have as before, 





 ABBBABBB ppqq +−=−= 11  
A’s program in the second period is  
  ( ) ABABp qcpAB )1(max α−−       
where 1-α  is B’s first period market share, which yields the following best response 
function, 
 ( )cpp BBAB += 2
1        (1) 
Firm B’s second period program is  
 ( ) ( ) BABABBBBpp qcpqcpBABB *)1(max, αα −+−−  
where α  is A’s first period market share.  It yields the following best response functions, 
 ( )cpp ABBB ++= 12













    (3) 
 Solving (1) and (2) we get the optimal second period prices in B’s first period customers 












== BBAB qq  
  




 ( ){ } ( )( ) ABABBAAAAAAA qcpqqcp −−++−= αταπ 12  
 ( )( ) ( ) BABABBBBB qcpqcp −+−−= ααπ 12  
Now suppose A chooses Aτ  such that it completely stops  customers switching from A. 
The lowest Aτ  that stops switching completely is cpAAA −=τ . Then  1&0 == AABA qq . 











⎛ −−= cpAAA απ  























1 cpcp AAFAA αδαπ  






⎧ −+−−= αδαπ 1
9
411 FBB cp  
Note that the profits are increasing in first period market shares. In particular, B’s profit 
is zero if its first period market share is zero. 
Consumers’ choice of firms in the first period: 
  The  two-period discounted expected consumer surplus from choosing B is, 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ){ }[ ]AtoswitchsEpvAtoswitchobpvBwithstayobpvEU ABBBCBB |PrPr1 −−+−+−= δ
( ) ( ) CCBB cvpvEU δδ 18
11
1 −−+−=  
Since A chooses Aτ  to stop switching completely, a consumer that chooses A in the first 




 ( ) ( )AACAAA pvpvEU −+−= δ  
And since Aτ  stops switching completely, A will choose the highest possible second 
period price, i.e., vpAA =  




=α . This implies, 
 ( ) CCBABA cvppEUEU δδ 18
11
11 +−−=⇒=     (4) 
First period competition for market share will drive Bπ  to zero [bc of no switching? yes], 












1 FB cp δ−=  
Plugging in (4) we get, 




1 +−−−=  
Then  A’s two-period discounted profit is given by, 
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>=  . Also it can be easily 
shown that Aπ  is greater than Fδ9










upper constraint is  ( )
9
4




constraint on  ( )cv −  becomes considerably less stringent when the two discount factors 
are close. 
 We had shown earlier that if both firms do not use CWP the equilibrium profit is Fδ9
1 .  
This means no strategies of A involving not using CWP can achieve a profit higher 
than Fδ9
1  when B does not use CWP and chooses optimally. So A does better by using 
CWP than any strategy that involves not using CWP when B does not use CWP and 
chooses optimally. 
Now suppose firm B uses CWP. We have shown above that if A uses CWP and B 
doesn’t, B’s profit is zero. Since the problem is symmetric, A’s profit will be driven 
down to zero if B uses CWP and A doesn’t. Suppose A also uses CWP then there is no 
switching in the second period. A’s two-period discounted profit can be reduced to, 
 ( ) ( )[ ]αδπ cvcp FAA −+−= 1  
The game reduces to a pure Bertrand Price competition in the first period with profits 
increasing in market share. Competition for the first period market share drives profit 
down to zero. 
Hence no strategy involving not using CWP survives iterative elimination of weakly 










A.3 Proof of Proposition 3. 
Proposition 3: 
There exists a unique family of subgame perfect equilibria of the game (one equilibrium 
for each penalty level) in which both firms use CWP and the equilibrium strategies are as 
below: 





























By proposition 2 both firm will use CWP if available. 
Second period subgame: 
We have shown in the last proof that if  firm j  uses CWP as defined, firm i’s second 














 and that cp jjj −≥τ  completely stops switching in the second period. So the proposed 
strategies constitute  a Nash equilibrium in the second period subgame. Let us check for 
possible first period profitable deviations. At the proposed equilibrium, each firm earns 
zero profit and 1,0,
2
1
===== BBAAABBA qqqqα  . Since the problem is symmetric let 




 ( ) ( ) ( )( )[ ]ατααδαπ BAAABABAAAAFAA qqcpqcpcp +−−+−+−= 11  
Suppose A deviates to a lower penalty, say 0,2 >−−= εετ cvA . Then 
εεεα +=−=== cpqq BAAABA ,1,,1 . Then, 
 








FFA cvcvccvc  
Now suppose A deviates to a lower penalty and simultaneously raises first period price, 
1Ap , so that market share α  remains one half. This implies, 




















A can charge a first period price just below the above 1Ap   and get the entire market in 
the first period, i.e., 1=α . Then its profit is, 
 






























Hence deviating to a lower penalty is not a profitable deviation. 
We assume that the highest per period price that can be charged is v, the consumer’s 
valuation of the product. 
 Suppose A deviates to a lower second period contract price, 0, >−= εεvpAA . Then 
1,,1 === AABA qq εα  
 










Hence this is not a profitable deviation either. 
 Suppose A deviates to a higher first period  price, say ( ) 0,1 >+−−= εεδ cvcp FA . 
Then  0=α  and 0=Aπ . Now suppose A deviates to a lower first period price, say 
( ) 0,1 >−−−= εεδ cvcp FA . Then 1=α  and  
 






FFA cvccvc  
Hence this is not a profitable deviation. 
 Finally, suppose A deviates to a higher first period price, ( ) 0,1 >+−−= εεδ cvcp FA  
and simultaneously lowers second period contract price so that α  remains one-half. It 
can be shown by comparing the consumer surpluses that second period contract price 












































Hence this is not a profitable deviation either. 
So, the proposed strategies indeed constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium. Note that the 
equilibrium outcome is unique. The penalty level is not unique but the optimal prices  and 
market shares are unique  for each penalty greater than v-c,  and thus the equilibrium is 
unique for each penalty level, cvi −≥τ  





There exists a unique symmetric sub-game perfect equilibrium of the game in which 
contracts (CWP) are not feasible and the strategies are as follows: 





−=  and in the second period it chooses 
ijii pandp  optimally as described in the last section. 
Proof:  
 We have shown earlier that in the second period sub-game, each firm chooses 































So the proposed strategies constitute Nash equilibrium in the second period sub-game. It 
is also the unique Nash Equilibrium. Let us now check for possible first period profitable 
deviations. Since the problem is symmetric we shall look at firm A. The two-period 
discounted profit of firm A at the proposed equilibrium can be written as, 











* αδαπ FAA cp  
Suppose A deviates to any higher first period price, say 0,
3
1
1 >+−= εεδ FA cp , then it 
sells zero in the first period and its two-period discounted profit is, Fδ72
25 . Now suppose 
A deviates to any lower first period price, say 0,
3
1
1 >−−= εεδFA cp , then it  captures 






























Hence the proposed strategies indeed constitute a sub-game perfect equilibrium. 
Uniqueness of symmetric equilibrium: 
 Suppose there is another symmetric equilibrium pair of first period prices 




11 >+−== εεδ FBA cpp . Then the two-period discounted profit is, 
272
25 εδ +F . This cannot be an equilibrium because A can lower its price by just a little 
(by less than
2

















11 >−−== εεδ FBA cpp  Then the two-period discounted profit is, 272
25 εδ −F . 




Proof of Proposition 5. 
Proposition5.  
If Contact with Breach Penalty (CWP) is feasible  then no strategies that involve not 






 Suppose firm B doesn’t use CWP.  Firm A uses it. The marginal first period 
customer of A gets a realization of s and x such that, 













 Since B doesn’t use CWP we have as before, 












Firm A’s second period program is  
 























BBAB pcp        (1) 
Firm B’s second period program is , 
 ( )( ) ( ) BABABBBBBpp qcpqcpBABB −+−−= ααπ 1max 2,  















































  (3) 
Solving (1) & (2) we get the optimal second period prices in B’s first period market 









== BBAB qq  
 
The second period profits are, 
 ( ){ } ( )( ) ABABBAAAAAAA qcpqqcp −−++−= αταπ 12  
 ( )( ) ( ) BABABBBBB qcpqcp −+−−= ααπ 12  
Suppose A chooses Aτ  to completely stop its first period customers from switching. The 
lowest Aτ  which does that is, cpAAA −+= 1τ . Then we have, 1,0 == AABA qq . Then the 










































1 cpcp AAFAA αδαπ  






⎧ −+−−= αδαπ 1
72
4911 FBB cp  




  The two-period discounted expected consumer surplus from choosing B is, 
( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }[ ]switchsxEpvswitchobstayxEpvstayobpvEU ABBBCBB |Pr|1Pr1 +−−+−−−+−= δ
 
It is easy to show that, 
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Solving for the integrals and plugging in we get, 
 
 
Since A chooses Aτ  to stop switching completely, a consumer that chooses A in the first 
period has an expected  two-period discounted surplus, 









A pvpvxEpvpvEU δδ  
And since Aτ  stops switching completely, A would choose the highest possible second 
period price, i.e., vpAA =  




=α . This implies, 
 ( ) CCBABA cvppEUEU δδ 36
41
11 +−−=⇒=     (4) 
First period competition for market share will drive Bπ  to zero, 








⎡ +−= FBB cp δπ  









1 FB cp δ−=  
Plugging in (4) we get, 




1 +−−−=  
Then  A’s two-period discounted profit is given by, 
 
( )






































>=  . Also it can be easily 
shown that Aπ  is greater than Fδ72










The upper constraint is  ( )
72
49
>− cv   for the extreme case where 0=Cδ   and 1=Fδ . 
The constraint on  ( )cv −  becomes considerably less stringent when the two discount 
factors are close. 
We had shown earlier that if both firms do not use CWP the equilibrium profit is Fδ72
25 .  
This means no strategies of A involving not using CWP can achieve a profit higher 
than Fδ72
25  when B also chooses optimally. So A does better by using CWP than any 
strategy that involves not using CWP when B does not use CWP and chooses optimally. 
 
Suppose B uses CWP. If A doesn’t use CWP it gets zero. If she chooses CWP, the worst 




Hence proved.  
 
 
A.6. Derivation of Optimal Penalty. 
 The optimal penalty 
3
1* +−= cpAAAτ , maximizes the second period optimal 
profit of firm A for a given AAp . 
Derivation: 




max,max 2  
It is easy to show that if 
3
1
+−= cpAAAτ , then, ( )14
1 * +−−= ABAAABA ppq τ  and optimal 
( )12
3




+−−= cpq AAABA τ . Hence the maximization program is, 




 and the first order condition is given by, 
 ( )( ) 031331 =−+−+−− AAAAAA cpcp ττ  














1,1 cpcp AAAAAτ  
The second order condition for a maximum is, 
 06466 <+−+− AAA cp τ  
Plugging the roots we find that the SOC is satisfied only for the second root. 
 Hence, 
3








Appendix to Chapter 3. 
 
 
B.1 Matlab Codes and results.  
Let x, y and z denote BAA pandpp 21 ,  respectively. Equilibrium solutions satisfying 
second order conditions are shown in bold. 

















[  -1.42413088769587870240169764983] 




[  1.881376547958447702585975956909] 








[  .56303705378257793915414285717888] 
[  .78259441411740684855759241716628] 
[  2.3452154919016853800847573928758] 








[  -5.323522326362843734355736211816] 
[  -5.744864702319461858245679456498] 
[ -11.000078719438354368247572663978] 
[  .47182300872712834088353874742998] 
[  .39108236041543823972298528493081] 
[   .2657627478780817678689362134437] 





















[  .27562417367146416344235697180483] 
[  1.1627639022737402534048806871419] 
[  1.8827735492071808798030112550421] 








[  .63211081917582159494174470600854] 
[  .85584661658016357746227829977045] 
[  2.3481030618253065574586003641320] 








[  .49072847193114141406373237369906] 
[  .40558686531507150549439240016506] 













































































































































































Table B.1. List of City Terminals selling wholesale unbranded Gasoline during August 1999 
  1Ap  2Ap  Bp  
Three sellers case 0.250 0.563 0.472
0=c  
Two sellers case 1.000 1.000 0.500
     
Three sellers case 0.252 0.570 0.474
01.0=c  
Two sellers case 0.965 1.008 0.510
     
Three sellers case 0.263 0.598 0.482
05.0=c  
Two sellers case 0.919 1.024 0.524
     
Three sellers case 0.276 0.632 0.491
1.0=c  
Two sellers case 0.884 1.040 0.534
     
Three sellers case 0.300 0.700 0.508
2.0=c  






  City state   city state   City state   city state 
1 Anchorage AK 76 Kankakee IL 151 Springfield MO 226 Northumberland PA 
2 Fairbanks AK 77 Peoria IL 152 St. Louis MO 227 Philadelphia PA 
3 Anniston/Oxford AL 78 Robinson IL 153 Biloxi MS 228 Pittsburgh PA 
4 Birmingham AL 79 Rockford IL 154 Collins MS 229 Scranton PA 
5 Mobile AL 80 Wood River IL 155 Greenville MS 230 Sinking Springs PA 
6 Montgomery AL 81 Evansville IN 156 Meridian MS 231 Warren PA 
7 El Dorado AR 82 Hammond IN 157 Pascagoula MS 232 Williamsport PA 
8 Ft.Smith AR 83 Huntington IN 158 Vicksburg MS 233 Providence RI 
9 Little Rock AR 84 Indianapolis IN 159 Bozeman MT 234 Belton SC 
10 Rogers AR 85 Muncie IN 160 Missoula MT 235 Charleston SC 
11 West Memphis AR 86 Princeton IN 161 Charlotte NC 236 North Augusta SC 
12 Flagstaff AZ 87 Coffeyville KS 162 Fayetteville NC 237 Spartanburg SC 
13 Phoenix AZ 88 Concordia KS 163 Greensboro NC 238 Aberdeen SD 
14 Tucson AZ 89 El Dorado KS 164 Raleigh/Apex NC 239 Mitchell SD 
15 Bakersfield CA 90 Great Bend KS 165 Selma NC 240 Rapid City SD 
16 Barstow CA 91 Hutchinson KS 166 Wilmington NC 241 Sioux Falls SD 
17 Brisbane CA 92 Kansas City KS 167 Fargo ND 242 Watertown SD 
18 Chico CA 93 McPherson KS 168 Grand Forks ND 243 Wolsey SD 
19 Colton CA 94 Olathe KS 169 Jamestown ND 244 Yankton SD 
20 Eureka CA 95 Phillipsburg KS 170 Columbus NE 245 Chattanooga TN 
21 Fresno CA 96 Salina KS 171 Doniphan NE 246 Knoxville TN 
22 Imperial CA 97 Scott City KS 172 Geneva NE 247 Memphis TN 
23 Los Angeles CA 98 Topeka KS 173 Lincoln NE 248 Nashville TN 
24 Sacramento CA 99 Wathena KS 174 Norfolk NE 249 Abilene TX 
25 San Diego CA 100 Wichita KS 175 North Platte NE 250 Amarillo TX 




27 San Jose CA 102 Covington KY 177 Osceola NE 252 Beaumont TX 
28 Stockton CA 103 Lexington KY 178 Sidney NE 253 Big Spring TX 
29 Colorado Springs CO 104 Louisville KY 179 Newington NH 254 Brownsville TX 
30 Denver CO 105 Owensboro KY 180 Newark NJ 255 Bryan TX 
31 Fountain CO 106 Paducah KY 181 Paulsboro NJ 256 Caddo Mills TX 
32 La Junta CO 107 Arcadia LA 182 Albuquerque NM 257 Center TX 
33 Hartford/Rocky Hill CT 108 Archie LA 183 Artesia NM 258 Corpus Christi TX 
34 New Haven CT 109 Baton Rouge LA 184 Bloomfield NM 259 Dallas Metro TX 
35 Wilmington DE 110 Chalmette LA 185 Ciniza NM 260 Edinburg TX 
36 Jacksonville FL 111 Convent/Garyville LA 186 Las Vegas NV 261 El Paso TX 
37 Miami FL 112 Lake Charles LA 187 Sparks/Reno NV 262 Gulf Coast TX 
38 Niceville FL 113 Monroe LA 188 Albany NY 263 Harlingen TX 
39 Orlando FL 114 New Orleans LA 189 Binghamton/Vestal NY 264 Hearne TX 
40 Panama City FL 115 Shreveport LA 190 Buffalo NY 265 Hidalgo TX 
41 Pensacola FL 116 Boston MA 191 Long Island NY 266 Houston TX 
42 St.Marks FL 117 Springfield MA 192 New York NY 267 Laredo TX 
43 Tampa FL 118 Baltimore MD 193 Newburgh NY 268 Lubbock TX 
44 Albany GA 119 Salisbury MD 194 Rochester NY 269 Midland/Odessa TX 
45 Americus GA 120 Bangor ME 195 Syracuse NY 270 Mt. Pleasant TX 
46 Athens GA 121 Portland ME 196 Utica NY 271 San Angelo TX 
47 Atlanta GA 122 Bay City MI 197 Akron/Canton OH 272 San Antonio TX 
48 Bainbridge GA 123 Cheboygan MI 198 Cincinnati OH 273 Sherrin TX 
49 Chattahooche GA 124 Detroit MI 199 Cleveland OH 274 Three Rivers TX 
50 Columbus GA 125 Ferrysburg MI 200 Columbus OH 275 Tyler TX 
51 Griffin GA 126 Flint MI 201 Dayton OH 276 Victoria/Placedo TX 
52 Macon GA 127 Jackson MI 202 Heath OH 277 Waco TX 
53 Rome GA 128 Lansing MI 203 Lebanon OH 278 Wichita Falls TX 




55 Bettendorf IA 130 Niles MI 205 Lorain OH 280 Fairfax VA 
56 Council Bluffs IA 131 Traverse City MI 206 Marietta OH 281 Norfolk VA 
57 Des Moines IA 132 Alexandria MN 207 Sciotoville OH 282 Richmond VA 
58 Dubuque IA 133 Duluth MN 208 Tiffin OH 283 Roanoke VA 
59 Ft. Dodge IA 134 Duluth MN 209 Toledo OH 284 Anacortes WA 
60 Ft. Madison IA 135 Mankato MN 210 Youngstown OH 285 Moses Lake WA 
61 Iowa City IA 136 Marshall MN 211 Ardmore OK 286 Pasco WA 
62 Lemars IA 137 Minneapolis MN 212 Enid OK 287 Seattle WA 
63 Mason Cty/Clr.Lk IA 138 Rochester MN 213 Laverne OK 288 Spokane WA 
64 Milford IA 139 Roseville MN 214 Oklahoma City OK 289 Tacoma WA 
65 Ottumwa IA 140 Sauk Centre MN 215 Ponca City OK 290 Wilma WA 
66 Rock Rapids IA 141 St.Paul MN 216 Shawnee OK 291 Chippewa Falls WI 
67 Sioux City IA 142 Belle MO 217 Tulsa OK 292 Green Bay WI 
68 Waterloo IA 143 Cape Girardeau MO 218 Turpin OK 293 Junction City WI 
69 Boise ID 144 Carrollton MO 219 Wynnewood OK 294 Madison WI 
70 Burley ID 145 Carthage MO 220 Eugene OR 295 Milwaukee WI 
71 Pocatello ID 146 Columbia MO 221 Portland OR 296 Superior WI 
72 Amboy IL 147 Jefferson City MO 222 Altoona PA 297 Waupun WI 
73 Champaign IL 148 Mt.Vernon MO 223 Harrisburg PA 298 Wausau WI 
74 Chicago IL 149 Palmyra MO 224 Macungie PA 299 Charleston WV 
















Table B.2.  Refiners selling unbranded gasoline during August 1999 
 
 
1 Aectra 21 Ergon 41 Minn.Solv 60 Rio 
2 Agway 22 Exxon 42 MinnIowa 61 Shamrock 
3 Amoco 23 Farm & H 43 Murphy 62 Shell 
4 Apex 24 Fina 44 Navajo 63 So.States 
5 BP 25 Flying J 45 New West 64 Sprague 
6 Berry-Hnk 26 Frontier 46 Noco 65 Streett 
7 Buckeye 27 Gary Ener 47 Northeast 66 TAC 
8 Catamount 28 Giant 48 Northrdge 67 Tesoro 
9 Center 29 Global 49 Oil Prod. 68 Texaco 
10 Chevron 30 Hartford 50 Pal 69 Tosco 
11 Chief Eth 31 Hess 51 Parker 70 Total 
12 Citgo 32 Hunt 52 Pennzoil 71 TransMont 
13 Clark 33 Inland 53 Pet Produ 72 U.S. Oil 
14 Coast 34 Irving 54 Petro.Ser 73 Ultramar 
15 Colonial 35 Kern 55 Petron 74 United Re 
16 CountryEn 36 Koch 56 Phillips 75 Valero 
17 Crandall 37 Leffler 57 Placid 76 Wesco 
18 Crown 38 Lion 58 Pride 77 Western Refining 
19 Dale 39 Marathon 59 Primary 78 Westside 


























Table B.3.  City-Terminals where Marathon sells both unbranded and branded gasoline. 
 
 city state  city state  City state  city state
1 Miami FL 12 Covington KY 23 Roseville MN 34 Lebanon OH
2 Tampa FL 13 Lexington KY 24 St.Paul MN 35 Lima OH
3 Athens GA 14 Bay City MI 25 St.Louis MO 36 Toledo OH
4 Atlanta GA 15 Detroit MI 26 Charlotte NC 37 Youngstown OH
5 Columbus GA 16 Flint MI 27 Greensboro NC 38 Midland PA
6 Macon GA 17 Jackson MI 28 Akron/Canton OH 39 Pittsburgh PA
7 Chicago IL 18 Muskegon MI 29 Cincinnati OH 40 Belton SC
8 Kankakee IL 19 Niles MI 30 Cleveland OH 41 Knoxville TN
9 Rockford IL 20 Duluth MN 31 Columbus OH 42 Green Bay WI
10 Evansville IN 21 Minneapolis MN 32 Dayton OH 43 Milwaukee WI
11 Ashland KY 22 Rochester MN 33 Heath OH 44 Superior WI































Table B.4. City terminals where Marathon sells only unbranded gasoline. 
 
 
 City state  city state  city state  city state 
1 Birmingham AL 14 Milford IA 27 Selma NC 41 North Augusta SC 
2 Montgomery AL 15 Sioux City IA 28 Wilmington NC 42 Spartanburg SC 
3 Jacksonville FL 16 Waterloo IA 29 Fargo ND 43 Aberdeen SD 
4 Orlando FL 17 Huntington IN 30 Grand Forks ND 44 Mitchell SD 
5 Albany GA 18 Indianapolis IN 31 Jamestown ND 45 Sioux Falls SD 
6 Bainbridge GA 19 Louisville KY 32 Columbus NE 46 Watertown SD 
7 Savannah GA 20 Paducah KY 33 Doniphan NE 47 Wolsey SD 
8 Council Bluffs IA 21 Convent/Garyville LA 34 Geneva NE 48 Yankton SD 
9 Des Moines IA 22 Baltimore MD 35 Lincoln NE 49 Chattanooga TN 
10 Dubuque IA 23 Cheboygan MI 36 Norfolk NE 50 Nashville TN 
11 Ft. Dodge IA 24 Alexandria MN 37 North Platte NE 51 Norfolk VA 
12 Iowa City IA 25 Mankato MN 38 Omaha NE 52 Richmond VA 
13 Mason Cty/Clr.Lk. IA 26 Marshall MN 39 Marietta OH 53 Roanoke VA 





































Figure B.1 PADD Map 














Figure B.2 Map of City Terminals in the United States. 






























Both:   Sell both branded and unbranded gasoline 
Unbranded:  Sell only unbranded gasoline 
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